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paired the effectiveness of the plea bargain in the criminal justice
system.
Thomas M. Gandolfo

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 400.21: The defendant has the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a predicate conviction asserted by the People
Section 400.21 of the Criminal Procedure Law governs the
procedure for sentencing a defendant as a second felony offender.10 2 Pursuant to this section, the prosecution must prove the
existence of any predicate felony conviction it intends to use to
enhance the defendant's sentence. 10 3 The defendant, however, is
1o See CPL § 400.21 (1983). A second felony offender is defined as "a person, other
than a second violent felony offender.., who stands convicted of a felony... other than a
class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony
convictions." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
CPL § 400.21 contains provisions substantially identical to three other enhancement
statutes. See CPL § 400.15 (1983) (procedure for determining whether defendant is a second
violent felony offender); CPL § 400.16 (1983) (procedure for determining whether defendant
is a persistent violent felony offender); CPL § 400.20 (1983) (procedure for determining
whether defendant should be sentenced as a persistent felony offender). These sections generally are applied in a similar manner, see People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 459
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Graham, 111 Misc. 2d 666, 669-70,
444 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981); CPL § 400.15, commentary at 218-19
(1983), and, therefore, for the purposes of this survey, will be referred to interchangeably.
Recidivist statutes, such as CPL § 400.21, are designed to subject repeat offenders to
punishment of a more severe nature. See CPL § 400.21, commentary at 235 (1983). Recidivist statutes have survived a wide range of constitutional attacks. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (cruel and unusual punishment); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 451-54 (1962) (notice and opportunity to be heard); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616, 625, 629-30 (1912) (due process and equal protection); Leston, 117 Misc. 2d at 713, 459
N.Y.S.2d at 365 (ex post facto challenge). See generally Note, Recidivist Procedures:
Prejudice and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. Rsv. 337, 337 & n.1 (1968) (discussion of the
continued stability of recidivist statutes despite numerous constitutional attacks).
103 CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983). In addition to proving the existence of a predicate conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant to be sentenced was in fact the person convicted of the prior felony. Id. Section 400.21(2) of the CPL requires that the
prosecutor file a statement before sentence is imposed. Id. § 400.21(2). The statement must
set forth the specifies of the date and place of each alleged predicate felony conviction the
People intend to use for enhancement purposes. Id.; see People v. Towns, 94 App. Div. 2d
973, 973, 464 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100 (4th Dep't 1983); People v. Brown, 54 App. Div. 2d 719, 719,
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afforded the opportunity to controvert any alleged predicate con1 04
viction on the ground that it was obtained unconstitutionally.
387 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (2d Dep't 1976); see also R. PfLE, NEw YORK CRUMNAL PRACTCE
Under CPL § 13.26, at 721-22 (1972), the defendant must be given a copy of the prosecutor's statement, and if the defendant wishes to contest an allegation made in the statement,
he must specify the allegation he wishes to controvert. CPL § 400.21(3) (1983).
I04 CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983); R. PrnER, supra note 103, § 13.31, at 724. Section
400.21(7)(b) provides in pertinent part:
The defendant may, at any time... controvert an allegation with respect to such
conviction in the statement on the grounds that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.
CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983).
A predicate hearing is held whenever the defendant controverts an allegation in the
prosecutor's statement and the uncontroverted allegations "are not sufficient to support a
finding that the defendant has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction." Id. §
400.21(5); see, e.g., People v. Nalo, 91 App. Div. 2d 957, 957, 458 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (1st
Dep't 1983); People v. Jensen, 89 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1020, 454 N.Y.S.2d 681, 681 (2d Dep't
1982); see also R. PrrTLE, supra note 103, § 13.30 at 723. Any allegation not controverted is
deemed admitted by the defendant. CPL § 400.21(3) (1983). However, a hearing is not required when the defendant fails to raise any factual support for his claim, see People v.
Spencer, 32 N.Y.2d 446, 450-51, 299 N.E.2d 651, 653, 346 N.Y.S.2d 225; 227-28 (1973), or
when the record clearly establishes the existence and constitutionality of the predicate conviction, see People v. Stewart, 96 App. Div. 2d 622, 623, 464 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886-87 (3d Dep't
1983); People v. Ayala, 112 Misc. 2d 821, 827-28, 448 N.Y.S.2d 354, 358-59 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1982).
Procedures for challenging the constitutionality of a predicate conviction in a multiple
felony offender hearing were first incorporated into law in 1964. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1943, ch.
446, § 1, [1964] N.Y. Laws 668 (repealed 1967) (current version as amended at CPL §
400.20(6) (1983)). It was believed that a statutory method would be a timely and convenient
procedure to challenge state convictions. People v. DiGiacomo, 96 App. Div. 2d 1127, 1128,
467 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (3d Dep't 1983); Memoranda of State Attorney General, reprintedin
[1964] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 57 [hereinafter cited as Memoranda]. Moreover, since it was considered a violation of due process not to afford the defendant an in-state forum in which to
challenge the constitutionality of an out-of-state conviction, see People ex. rel. Warren v.
Smith, 79 Misc. 2d 643, 644, 361 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (Wyoming County Ct. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 54 App. Div. 2d 820, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (4th Dep't 1976); Governor's Memoranda
on Bills Approved (S.L 445, Pr. 4007, McEwen), reprintedin [1964] N.Y. LIcs. ANN. 514,
515 [hereinafter cited as Memo]. In Governor's Memoranda on Approval of ch. 446, N.Y.
Laws, an additional procedure was created to provide a New York forum to challenge a
conviction obtained out-of-state, see DiGiacomo, 96 App. Div. 2d at 1128, 467 N.Y.S.2d at
728; Smith, 79 Misc. 2d at 645, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 127; Memo, supra, at 514-15; Memoranda,
supra, at 57.
The only permissible challenge to the constitutionality of a predicate conviction is an
allegation of a violation of the United States Constitution. CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983); see .
PnrLEn, supra note 103, § 13.31, at 724. Accordingly, violations of the state constitution or of
statutory procedures will not suffice to discount the predicate conviction. See, e.g., People v.
Alston, 83 App. Div. 2d 744, 745, 443 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (4th Dep't 1981) (alleged violation
of CPL § 720.20); People v. Ayala, 112 Misc. 2d 821, 822, 448 N.Y.S.2d 354, 357 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1982) (alleged violation of state policy). If the court determines that the predicate felony conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution, then the conviction
cannot be used as a predicate felony conviction. CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983); see People v.
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The Appellate Division has been divided on the issue of which
party bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of the alleged predicate conviction. 0 5 Recently, however, in People v. Harris,106 the Court of Appeals held that section 400.21 of the CPL
places the burden of proving the 10unconstitutionality
of the predi7
cate conviction on the defendant.

In Harris,six cases presenting the identical issue were consolidated on appeal.108 In each case, the People sought an increased
sentence of imprisonment pursuant to section 70.06 of the Penal
Law.10 The defendants challenged the use of their respective prior
felony convictions, alleging that their guilty pleas had been obMcNeil, 117 Misc. 2d 96, 100, 457 N.Y.S.2d 409, 412 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982); R.
PrrLER, supra note 103, § 13.31, at 724.
105 Compare People v. Thompson, 60 App. Div. 2d 765, 765, 400 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (4th
Dep't 1977) (burden of proving constitutionality of predicate conviction on People) with
People v. Bonk, 83 App. Div. 2d 695, 695, 442 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (3d Dep't 1981) (burden of
proving unconstitutionality upon defendant) and People v. Harley, 52 App. Div. 2d 698, 698,
382 N.Y.S.2d 585, 585 (3d Dep't 1976) (defendant has burden of establishing unconstitutionality of previous conviction). Just as the departments of the Appellate Division have
differed as to the proper allocation of the burden of proof, there has been a split among the
trial courts that have addressed the burden of proving the constitutionality of predicate
conviction. Compare People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 459 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (burden of proof as to constitutionality on People) and People v.
Celli, 105 Misc. 2d 1005, 1008, 430 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951 (Westchester County Ct. 1980) (People
met their burden of proving predicate conviction constitutionally obtained) with People v.
Abbott, 113 Misc. 2d 766, 781, 449 N.Y.S.2d 853, 863 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (placing
upon defendant the burden of establishing unconstitutionality of previous conviction) and
People v. Broderick, 43 Misc. 2d 1014, 1016, 252 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1964), appeal dismissed, 24 App. Div. 2d 638, 262 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1965) (defendant
has burden of proving deprivation of his constitutional rights). Similarly, there has been no
consensus among the courts as to the level of proof necessary to sustain that burden. See,
e.g., Leston, 117 Misc. 2d at 717, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 367 (ultimate burden on People probably
one of "clear and convincing evidence"); People v. Anderson, 117 Misc. 2d 284, 284, 458
N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982) (People have burden beyond a reasonable
doubt); Abbott, 113 Misc. 2d at 781, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (defendant must show prior conviction unconstitutional by "some quantum of evidence"); Broderick, 43 Misc. 2d at 101620, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 840-44 (burden on defendant "by a fair preponderance of the
evidence").
100 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1983).
1I7 Id. at 15, 459 N.E.2d at 172, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
108Id. In addition to People v. Harris (No. 679), the five cases involved in the appeal
were: People v. Lewis (No. 580), People v. Ramsey (No. 581), People v. Vargas (No. 582),
People v. Alicea (No. 583), and People v. Burgo (No. 584). The consolidated issue was
"whether a prior felony conviction, based upon a guilty plea which was entered without the
defendant having been advised by the court of the specific constitutional rights being
waived by that plea, may constitute a predicate felony for the purpose of sentencing the
defendant as a second felony offender." Id.
109 Id.
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tained unconstitutionally. 110 The Court held that a guilty plea is
not invalid solely because the trial judge failed to enumerate each
of the rights the defendant waives by entry of the plea.""' Consequently, the Court ordered that five of the six defendants be sen112
tenced as second felony offenders.
Writing for the Court, Judge Jasen acknowledged that the defendant must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his
rights upon entering a guilty plea.'1 3 The Court, however, disagreed with the defendants' contention that a specific recitation of
rights and multiple explicit waivers is required. 4 Rather, the
Court concluded that the crucial inquiry should be whether, in the
totality of circumstances, the plea" 'represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.' "1115 In reviewing the applicable procedure under section 400.21 of the CPL, the Court stated that after the prosecution
established the fact of the prior conviction, it was incumbent upon
"the defendant to allege and prove the facts underlying the claim
210 Id.
" Id. at 16, 459 N.E.2d at 173, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
112 See id. at 15-16, 459 N.E.2d at 173, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
111 Id. at 17, 459 N.E.2d at 173, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969); People v. Lewis, 94 App. Div. 2d 670, 671, 462 N.Y.S.2d 665, 666 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1983); People v. McNeil, 117
Misc. 2d 96, 99, 457 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
114 61 N.Y.2d at 16, 459 N.E.2d at 173, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court was presented with a guilty plea
where the record was virtually silent as to the circumstances surrounding the plea. 395 U.S.
at 239-40. The Boykin Court reversed the conviction because the record did not disclose
whether the guilty plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily. Id. at 244. The Court
noted that several constitutional rights are involved whenever a defendant enters a guilty
plea, namely, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and
the right to confront one's accusers. Id. at 243; see Harris,61 N.Y.2d at 17, 459 N.E.2d at
174, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 65; People v. McNeil, 117 Misc. 2d 96, 98, 457 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
The Harris Court noted that Boykin approved a "colloquy procedure" in which the
trial court examines the defendant to determine whether he understands the nature of the
charges, his right to a jury trial, and the elements of the offense. 61 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 459
N.E.2d at 174, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 65 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244 n.7). The Boykin Court,
however, did not require the trial judge to include a specific enumeration of each right being
waived. See 395 U.S. at 242-44. Furthermore, the Harris Court noted that the Federal court
of appeals and state courts that have considered the question have held that a detailed
articulation and waiver of the individual rights is not constitutionally mandated. 61 N.Y.2d
at 19, 459 N.E.2d at 175, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
215 61 N.Y.2d at 19, 459 N.E.2d at 175, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 66 (quoting North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).
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that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." 116 In five of
the cases the Court held that the defendant's burden was not sustained because the presumption of regularity accorded the prior
convictions was not overcome by substantial evidence to the
117
contrary.
The Harris Court, in a terse resolution of the issue, concluded
that the defendant bears the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a predicate conviction. 1 8 It is suggested that the Court incorrectly applied section 400.21 of the CPL, and in so doing failed
to afford the defendants their due process rights. Subsection (7)(a)
of section 400.21 places upon the prosecution the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt both the existence of the predicate
conviction and that the defendant is the person who was previously convicted.11 9 Satisfaction of this burden, therefore, is an es116 61 N.Y.2d at 15, 459 N.E.2d at 172, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 63; see CPL § 400.21(7)(a)
(1983); R. PiTLER, supra note 103, § 13.32, at 724. There has been no dispute concerning
who bears the burden of proving the prior conviction, nor has there been a dispute as to the
level of proof required to sustain it. See, e.g., People v. Allah, 66 App. Div. 2d 665, 665, 410
N.Y.S.2d 833, 833-34 (1st Dep't 1978); People v. Korsen, 117 Misc. 2d 875, 876, 459
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Tesoriero, 108 Misc. 2d 1055,
1057, 439 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (Nassau County Ct. 1981). For a further discussion of §
400.21(7)(a), see infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
127 61 N.Y.2d at 16, 459 N.E.2d at 173, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
118 Id.
119 CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983); see People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 715-16, 459
N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Abbott, 113 Misc. 2d 766, 780, 449
N.Y.S.2d 853, 863 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). Section 400.21(7)(a) provides in pertinent
part
The burden of proof is upon the people and a finding that the defendant has been
subjected to a predicate felony conviction must be based upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983). Section 70.04(1)(b) of the Penal Law sets forth the criteria for
determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate violent felony conviction. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.04(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see also People v. Korsen, 117
Misc. 2d 875, 876, 878, 459 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v.
Tesoriero, 108 Misc. 2d 1055, 1057, 439 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (Nassau County Ct. 1981).
At least one court has held that the unchallenged production of a certificate of conviction is sufficient to sustain the People's burden as to the defendant's identity. See People v.
Seppinni, 119 Misc. 2d 125, 131, 462 N.Y.S.2d 956, 960 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); see
also R. PrrLER, supra note 103, § 13.32, at 724 (certificate from Commissioner of Correction
is prima facie evidence of predicate conviction); cf. People v. Allah, 66 App. Div. 2d 665,
665, 410 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (1st Dep't 1978) (uncertified arrest record insufficient). Mug
shots and fingerprints also may be used to sustain the People's burden of proving the defendant's identity. See Allah, 66 App. Div. 2d at 665, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 834. In Allah, the court
concluded that an uncertified arrest record containing information compiled from other
records would not suffice to connect the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the prior
felony conviction. Id.; see also Korsen, 117 Misc. 2d at 878, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (People
proved only a prior misdemeanor); People v. Taylor, 86 Misc. 2d 445, 448, 382 N.Y.S.2d 688,
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sential element of the prosecutor's use of the enhanced sentencing
procedure. 120 Subsection (7)(b), while not allocating the burden of
proof,121 permits the defendant to contest the constitutionality of

the predicate conviction. 22 Once the conviction is challenged, the
existence of a constitutional conviction becomes an essential element of the prosecutor's case, 23 since an unconstitutional conviction may not be used to invoke the enhanced sentence mechanism.1 24 Therefore, it is submitted that since the elements of
690 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976) (where sentence had been set aside, previous conviction
could not be used as a predicate felony).
120 CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983); see People v. Allah, 66 App. Div. 2d 665, 665, 410
N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (1st Dep't 1978); People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 459 N.Y.S.2d
364, 367 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
121 See CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983); People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 459
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Abbott, 113 Misc. 2d 766, 780,449
N.Y.S.2d 853, 863 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
122 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
123 The constitutionality of the predicate conviction is not an essential element of the
offense charged because enhancement statutes relate only to defendants who already stand
convicted of an offense. See CPL § 400.21(1) (1983); see also People v. Taylor, 86 Misc. 2d
445, 446-47, 382 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976). In State v. Martin, 336
S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1960), the Missouri court stated that:
[W]hile a prior conviction charged for the purpose of increasing punishment is not
an "essential element of the offense" for which a defendant is on trial, it is an
"essential element of the case" on trial, as to which element the state has the
same burden of proof ... as it has to any other essential element of the case.
Id. at 397 (quoting loosely, State v. Kimbrough, 166 S.W.2d 1077, 1081 (Mo. 1942)); see
State v. Barry, 605 S.W.2d 148, 149 n.1 (Mo. 1980).
124 See CPL § 400.21(7)(b) (1983). Section 400.21(7)(b) of the CPL provides in pertinent part:
A previous conviction in this or any other jurisdiction which was obtained in violation of the rights of the defendant under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States must not be counted in determining whether the defendant has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction.
Id.; see also United States ex. rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 964 (2d Cir. 1973) (absent proof that defendants had counsel the people may not use prior conviction); People v.
Johnson, 62 App. Div. 2d 1174, 1174, 404 N.Y.S.2d 200, 200 (4th Dep't 1978) (conviction
obtained in violation of constitutional rights may not be used to heighten defendant's sentence); People v. Taylor, 86 Misc. 2d 445, 445-46, 382 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1976) (failure to treat defendant as youthful offender denied People right to use
prior conviction.)
Various lower courts have denied enhanced sentencing when the People failed to show
the constitutionality of the predicate conviction. See, e.g., People v. Kordresse, 118 Misc. 2d
243, 246, 460 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Anderson, 117 Misc.
2d 284, 291-92, 458 N.Y.S.2d 463, 468 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1982); People v. McNeil, 117
Misc. 2d 96, 99-100, 457 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). In Kordresse,
the court stated that since it was impossible to conclude that the defendant's plea was entered voluntarily, the prior conviction could not be used as a predicate felony for the purpose of increased sentencing. Kordresse, 118 Misc. 2d at 246, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 451. In Ander-
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subsections (7) (a) and (7)(b) are both prerequisites to the enhancement of a sentence, the allocation and degree of proof should be
identical.
An enhanced penalty statute includes the previous commission
of the same or similar crime as an element in the prosecution for a
more severely punished offense. 12 5 Reflecting the importance society places on an individual's right to life and liberty, due process
considerations have been held applicable to enhanced penalty statutes.126 Although the prior conviction under such a statute is an
actual element of the offense,127 it is proposed that the rationale
behind the allocation of the burden of proof in an enhanced penson, the court stated that since the People failed to sustain their burden of proving the
constitutionality of the prior conviction, the defendant could not be sentenced as a second
felony offender. Anderson, 117 Misc. 2d at 291-92, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 468; accord McNeil, 117
Misc. 2d at 99-100, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12.
It is important to note that once the prior conviction is found to be constitutional, the
sentencing procedures provided for in the statute become mandatory. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.04(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see People v. Brown, 54 App. Div. 2d 719, 719, 387
N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (2d Dep't 1976); People v. Taylor, 86 Misc. 2d 445, 446, 382 N.Y.S.2d 688,
689 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
125 See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222-23 (1980). Some examples of enhancement
statutes in New York are § 265.02 of the Penal Law, see People v. Solomon, 113 Misc. 2d
790, 800, 449 N.Y.S.2d 875, 882 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1982), and § 1192 of the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law, see People v. Dorn, 105 Misc. 2d 244, 246-47, 431 N.Y.S.2d 974,
975-76 (Oneida County Ct. 1980). New York Vehicle and Traffic Laws § 1192(5) provides in
pertinent part:
A violation of subdivision two, three or four of this section shall be a misdemeanor.... A person who operates a vehicle in violation of subdivisions two or
three of this section after having been convicted of a violation of subdivisons two
or three of this section ...

shall be guilty of a felony.

N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 1192(5) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (emphasis added); see People v. Sirianna, 109 Misc. 2d 781, 781, 440 N.Y.S.2d 988, 988-89 (Cattaraugus County Ct.
1981), rev'd, 89 App. Div. 2d 775, 453 N.Y.S.2d 485 (4th Dep't 1982); Dorn, 105 Misc. 2d at
244-45, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02 provides that a person who commits the crime of criminal
possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, a class A misdemeanor, and who has also been
previously convicted of any crime shall be guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree, a class D felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(1) (McKinney 1980); see Solomon,
113 Misc. 2d at 793-94, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
116 See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 226-28 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
127 See People v. Solomon, 113 Misc. 2d 790, 800, 449 N.Y.S.2d 875; 882 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1982). The court stated:
Even more persuasive is that "due process of law" requires that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element which constitutes the crime
charged against a defendant. Here the prior conviction is an element of the offense
for the purpose of enhancing punishment by raising the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Id. (citations omitted).
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alty statute is equally applicable to section 400.21 of the CPL.128
Both statutes represent a similar threat to the defendant's liberty,1 29 as they both use prior convictions to increase the defendant's sentence.13 0 Additionally, it is testimony to their similarity
that in both statutes a prior conviction that was unconstitutionally
obtained cannot be used to enhance the defendant's punishment.1 31 While the CPL requires a constitutional predicate for an
enhanced sentence,1 32 the United States Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause makes the constitutionality of the
prior conviction an element of the offense in an enhanced penalty
statute.13 3 Due process also requires that the constitutionality be
128 The primary function of a standard of proof is allocation of the risk of error between
the litigants. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979). The "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard works to minimize
the effect of factual error on the individual, see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755; In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), and places that risk upon society, see Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755;
Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. This standard rests upon the fundamental principle that "it is
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Winship, 397 U.S. at
372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Addington, 441 U.S. at 428; Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring)). The Due
Process Concept is exemplified by the following passage from Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958):
There is always in litigation a margin of error ... which both parties must take
into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a
criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the

process of placing on the [prosecution] the burden of ...

persuading the

factfinder... of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 525-26.
129 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Once the defendant is found to be a
second felony offender, the enhancement of his sentence becomes mandatory. Id.
10 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 124 & accompanying text; see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
I- CPL ] 400].21(7)(b) (1983).

2" See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). In
Baldasar,the Court stated that a "prior [unconstitutional]... conviction could not be used
...
to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction." Id. at 226
(Marshall, J., concurring). Baldasar is the leading case dealing with the relationship of a
prior unconstitutional conviction to an enhanced penalty statute. In Baldasar,the defendant was charged with a felony pursuant to a statute providing for felony treatment of a
second conviction of an offense that originally was a misdemeanor. Id. at 223. The issue
before the Court was whether an unconstitutionally obtained misdemeanor conviction could
be used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony. Id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court held that such conviction could not be
used to elevate a misdemeanor to a felony. See id. at 224. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall recognized that the defendant had been deprived of his liberty as a result of the initial
conviction, id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring), and concluded that "a conviction which is
invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence of imprisonment for the offense itself is invalid
for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment for a subsequent conviction under a re-
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proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt.13 1 It is submitted that the defendant whose liberty is jeopardized under section 400.21(7)(b) of the CPL is no less entitled to these protections
than is a defendant under an enhanced penalty statute." 5 It appears, therefore, that by failing to recognize that the prosecution
should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the constitutionality of the prior conviction, the Harris Court failed to comply with the applicable due process safeguards.'"
It is suggested that when a defendant controverts a prosecutor's allegations sufficiently to warrant a predicate hearing, the
prosecutor must bear the burden of proving the constitutionality 13
of7
the defendant's previous conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prior conviction may be accorded a presumption of regularity 38 which would shift the burden of production to the defendant
peat-offender statute," id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
'14See People v. Solomon, 113 Misc. 2d 790, 800, 449 N.Y.S.2d 875, 882 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1982). In Solomon, the court realized that the Baldasarholding precluded the prosecution from relying on unconstitutionally obtained predicate conviction and permitted a
challenge to the constitutionality of defendant's prior conviction. Id. at 797, 449 N.Y.S.2d at
880. After a discussion of the possible methods the defendant could employ to challenge the
constitutionality of the prior conviction, the court determined that the circumstances were
most analogous to a motion to controvert a second felony offender statement. Id. at 800, 449
N.Y.S.2d at 881. After making this determination, the court stated "that the burden of
proof should be upon the People and that the quantum of proof should be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 800, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
'" In People v. DeJesus, 122 Misc. 2d 190, 471 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1983), the court recognized that:
[t]he urgent demands of due process have always been especially compelling
when a previously unchallenged judgment is claimed to lack constitutional validity
and that assertion is made at the very time that the judgment is sought to be used
to enhance the sentence of one newly convicted of another crime.
Id. at 192, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (citation omitted).
" In enacting CPL § 400.21(7)(a), the legislature acknowledged the possible deprivation of an individual's right to liberty through an enhanced sentence and afforded the defendant the desired protection by applying the same standard of proof as in a criminal case.
See CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983). Under CPL § 400.21(7)(b), the defendant faces the same
possible deprivation of his rights, since a prior constitutional conviction will enhance his
sentence. See id. § 400.21(7)(b). It is therefore suggested that an enhanced sentence has as
many implications in regards to the defendant's interest in life and liberty as does the initial
sentence, and thus requires identical due process protections.
"The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might
lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698
(1975).
1 See People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 459 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1983); accord People v. Sumstine, 147 Cal. App. 3d 866, 862, 195 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537
(1983); People v. Zabala, 147 Cal. App. 3d 429, 432, 195 Cal. Rtpr. 527, 531 (1983).
'8 See People v. Bell, 36 App. Div. 2d 406, 408, 321 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (2d Dep't 1971),

1984]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

and require him to produce evidence showing that his constitutional rights were infringed at the prior proceeding. 139 If the defendant were successful, the burden of production would shift back to
the prosecution requiring proof of a constitutionally obtained conviction.140 In this manner, the burden of proof would never shift to
the defendant.1 4 1 Section 400.21(7) of the CPL and due process

mandate that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that all the requirements for a predicate felony determination have
been satisfied. It is hoped that the suggested procedure will be
adopted by the courts to guarantee that criminal defendants are
aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 882, 278 N.E.2d 651, 328 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1972); People v. Leston, 117 Misc.
2d 712, 717, 459 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367-68 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Rosello, 97
Misc. 2d 963, 966, 412 N.Y.S.2d 975, 977 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979). The presumption of
regularity assumes "that no official or person acting under an oath of office will do anything
contrary to his official duty, oromit anything which official duty requires to be done." RICHAURSON ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 49 (J. Prince 10th ed. 1973) (quoting In re Estate of Marcellus,
165 N.Y. 70, 77, 58 N.E. 796, 798 (1900)); see McCoRMICK ON EVmECE § 343, at 969 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2534, at 488 (3d ed. 1940). In addition, the
presumption of regularity "compels the adversary to come forward with affirmative evidence
of unlawful or irregular conduct." RICHARDSON ON EVIDEN E,supra, § 72, at 49; see People v.
Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298, 97 N.E.2d 908, 912 (1951); accord People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d
204, 213, 430 P.2d 15, 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (1967) (en banc). This presumption would
require the defendant to specify the nature of his challenge and offer some proof in support
thereof since it would be unwarranted to require the People to prove that no constitutional
challenge exists. See Leston, 117 Misc. 2d at 717, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 367; Rosello, 97 Misc. 2d
at 966, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
139 The defendant is required to produce substantial evidence to the contrary in order
to rebut the presumption of regularity. See People v. Langan, 303 N.Y. 474, 480, 104 N.E.2d
861, 864 (1952); People v. Richetti, 302 N.Y. 290, 298, 97 NXE.2d 908, 912 (1951); RcHARDSON ON EVIDENcE, supra note 138, § 58, at 36. Once the defendant rebuts the presumption, it
drops from the case. See Richetti, 302 N.Y. at 298, 97 N.E.2d at 912; People v. Bell, 36 App.
Div. 2d 406, 408, 321 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (2d Dep't 1971), affl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 882, 278 N.E.2d
651, 28 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1972); RcHAIMSON ON EVIDENCE, supra note 138, § 58, at 36.
140 See People v. McNeil, 117 Misc. 2d 96, 99 n.3, 457 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 n.1 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1982); RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, supra note 138, § 58, at 36; accord People v.
Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 213, 430 P.2d 15, 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (1967) (en bane); People
v. Zavala, 147 Cal. App. 3d 429, 432, 195 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (1983). The prosecution must
produce independent evidence to establish the constitutionality of the prior conviction. See
McNeil, 117 Misc. 2d at 99, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 411; RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE, supranote 138,

§ 58, at 36; accord Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d at 212, 430 P.2d at 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 466; Zavala, 147
Cal. App. 3d at 432, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 531. If the prosecutor fails to sustain this burden the
prior conviction cannot be used to enhance the defendant's sentence. See Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d
at 213, 430 P.2d at 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
1 Cf. People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 413 n.15, 430 P.2d 15, 24 n.15, Cal. Rptr. 457, 466
n.15 (1967) (en banc) ("the burden of proof as to the constitutionality of the charged prior
conviction remains with the prosecution").
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afforded the fullest extent of their due process rights.

Steven F. Siegel

DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL § 236(B): A professional degree or license is not marital
property subject to apportionment during divorce proceedings
The Equitable Distribution Law145 mandates that courts equitably distribute marital property between the parties during the
dissolution of a marriage. 144 "Marital property" has been broadly
I" California cases have placed the burden of proving the constitutionality of a predicate conviction upon the People beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., People v. Coffey, 67
Cal. 2d 204, 213 n.15, 430 P.2d 15, 24 n.15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 n.15 (1967) (en banc);
People v. Sumstine, 147 Cal. App. 3d 866, 871, 195 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (1983); People v.
Zavala, 147 Cal. App. 3d 429, 432, 195 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (1983). In Coffey, the Supreme
Court of California held that the defendant had sufficiently alleged infringement of his right
to counsel to entitle him to a predicate hearing. 67 Cal. 2d at 213, 430 P.2d at 24, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 466. The procedure set out in Coffey was later adopted by statute. See Zavala, 147
Cal. App. 3d at 432, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
113 DRL § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Section 236 is divided into two subsections: Part A, governing all actions commenced prior to July 19, 1980, the effective date of
the new equitable distribution law, id. § 236(A), and Part B, controlling all proceedings
introduced on or after that date, id. § 236(B). Part A of § 236 retained the alimony provisions of the former law, with modifications in language to guarantee gender-neutral application. Compare id. § 236(B) with id. § 236 (1977). Part B of § 236 replaced the term "alimony" with "maintenance" to eliminate sexist stereotypes and misconceptions associated
with the former. Id. § 236, commentary at 38-39 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
144 Id. § 236(B) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The philosophy behind the Equitable
Distribution Law recognizes marriage as an "economic partnership" of co-equal parties.
Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 281, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1980), reprinted in
[1980] N.Y. Laws 1863 (McKinney). "Under the new provision marital property is to be
distributed equitably between the parties taking into consideration the circumstances of the
parties, included among the other factors is a spouse's contribution as a homemaker, the age
and health of the parties and the duration of the marriage." Memorandum of Assemblyman
Burrows, reprinted in [1980] N.Y. Legis. Ann. 129. Where equitable distribution would be
impractical or unduly burdensome, or where the distribution of an "interest in a business,
corporation or profession would be contrary to law," the court is authorized to grant a distributive award "in order to achieve equity between the parties." DRL § 236(B)(5)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). A distributive award is often employed where it is not physically
feasible to divide the marital property, see id. commentary at 140, for example, where the
primary asset is a pension plan or business interest, see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 93 App. Div. 2d
105, 111, 462 N.Y.S.2d 73, 77 (3d Dep't 1983) (non-vested pension plan acquired during
marriage deemed marital property); Roussos v. Roussos, 106 Misc. 2d 583, 585, 434 N.Y.S.2d

